Per the WSJ, it looks like institutional shareholders are voting against the pay package by a healthy margin.
I googled but couldn't find this. Can you point me to where this might be?
I found the article, but realized I misread the chart. The chart in the article references the institutional shareholders that voted against this package back in 2018.
I find it a stretch to think that many will vote for the package that didn’t vote for it before though.
My wife works with corporate governance issues every day, and her opinion is that the entire concept of corporate governance is a mockery if this type of pay package can be approved.
https://www.wsj.com/business/tesla-hits-the-road-to-persuade-shareholders-to-pay-elon-musk-46-billion-6ea31ea5?st=y87tmxucz8tqss6&reflink=article_copyURL_share
Thanks for the followup. Found a couple threads on reddit where shareholders were voting against the package, texas move, and board members. Of course there are the fanfic thread. There will be a lot voting both ways so it's anyone's guess which way the count will go.
But was nice to find a bunch of people holding the stock are done with elon and the board. But even if that is so, is change really possible with the board nothing more than a string of toadies for musk? how does a change over occur if the ceo and board are in cahoots?
It’s usually the institutional money that makes a difference. A fund voting 10M shares has a bit more say than a random redditor with 7 shares.
Tesla’s a little out of the norm, with significant shares held by individual investors. But I think you’re right that the mood has turned among individual investors.
From that WSJ chart, my rough math is that institutional shareholders voted against the package roughly 2:1 last time. It will be less this time. While anything can happen, I would put money on Elon getting his payday.
It’s hard to overstate how ridiculous and out of the norm this situation is. A Delaware court ruled that Tesla’s board was so conflicted that they couldn’t objectively set compensation for the CEO. No public company other than Tesla is crazy enough to put themselves in that situation.
Any other company in this situation would make fundamental changes to board composition and structure. Having a board that can’t objectively evaluate the CEO defeats the purpose of a board.
The one thing a company in this situation shouldn’t do is to cram through a comp plan that a court of law says was designed in a way into deceive shareholders. And even more importantly, a board that is struggling to appear independent shouldn’t be out selling said compensation plan to shareholders.