The reason the Supreme Court does so is to observe the cardinal rule of statutory construction which is "to save and not to destroy," an observation that effects the principle of judicial restraint.
I think you're going to be surprised and saddened at the decisions this term and next. Some of the Justices don't believe in precedent as much as you think they do.
Doubtless I've consistently opined that the Supreme Court will not overturn the A.C.A.
Time will tell if my prediction is correct.
I've been thinking about starting a thread that includes all of the Court's rationales that support my opinion.
This thread already includes a sprinkling of them.
It's a lot of work to write an opening post that includes all of them.
Lately I'm feeling lazy due to the springlike weather.
Maybe next fall?
Maybe next winter?
For now, Justice Harlan's dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) provides a cogent rationale in support of judicial restraint.
Is it meant that the determination of questions of legislative power depends upon the inquiry whether the statute whose validity is questioned is, in the judgment of the courts, a reasonable one, taking all the circumstances into consideration?
A statute may be unreasonable merely because a sound public policy forbade its enactment.
But I do not understand that the courts have anything to do with the policy or expediency of legislation.
A statute may be valid and yet, upon grounds of public policy, may well be characterized as unreasonable.
Mr. Sedgwick correctly states the rule when he says that, the legislative intention being clearly ascertained,
the courts have no other duty to perform than to execute the legislative will, without any regard to their views as to the wisdom or justice of the particular enactment.
There is a dangerous tendency in these latter days to enlarge the functions of the courts by means of judicial interference with the will of the people as expressed by the legislature.
Our institutions have the distinguishing characteristic that the three departments of government are coordinate and separate.
Each must keep within the limits defined by the Constitution.
And the courts best discharge their duty by executing the will of the lawmaking power, constitutionally expressed, leaving the results of legislation to be dealt with by the people through their representatives.
Statutes must always have a reasonable construction. Sometimes they are to be construed strictly; sometimes liberally, in order to carry out the legislative will.
But however construed, the intent of the legislature is to be respected, if the particular statute in question is valid, although the courts, looking at the public interests, may conceive the statute to be both unreasonable and impolitic.
If the power exists to enact a statute, that ends the matter so far as the courts are concerned.
The adjudged cases in which statutes have been held to be void because unreasonable are those in which the means employed by the legislature were not at all germane to the end to which the legislature was competent.