I did my undergrad in Econ in the late 90s when the idea of a 2% target was new enough our out of date textbooks still called for 0%. We had a few lectures that introduced the idea of low but non zero target as being somehow "better". I was skeptical at the time as I was a pure Friedman style Monetarist at the time. It has been frightening and fascinating to watch the Fed play with ZIRP, QE/QT, and what I think is a tacit acceptance of some of Mosler's work.
So, the idea of 2% target was present academically at least as far back as 1997. We never got particularly deep into it though because the 1998 currency crisis was the hot topic. Flooding markets with liquidity was considered essential to keep the whole global economy from disintegrating. That idea came back with a vengeance in 2008 and again for 2020/COVID.
I think of MMT actually as an offshoot of Reaganomics.
Reagan cut taxes and increased government spending, so that both would stimulate the economy. Meanwhile, Paul Volker (a Jimmy Carter nominee) was hiking
the FFR to 19% to stamp out inflation. So already we have the following ingredients:
- borrow from the future to stimulate demand now
- use monetary policy to offset inflationary effects of fiscal policy, rather than adapting fiscal policy to control inflation
- assumption we can rely on inflation to maintain a steady debt/GDP over time and it'll turn out all right
The trick worked and Reagan/Volker were credited with ending the stagflation and returning the US to growth.
The ballooning national debt started attracting attention in the early 90s (see Ross Perot) but rates kept falling, indicating surging demand for treasuries, so it was hard to say the national debt was a problem. A surging trade deficit (see globalization) created additional demand for US treasuries. The day of reckoning deficit hawks warned us about for 40 years has still never materialized. If anything, the growth of the national debt was counter-correlated with the steady fall in inflation for decades, contradicting all economic orthodoxy. There was clearly something wrong with our theories.
This is where Mosler enters the discussion - trying to explain how monetarism and classical economics failed to predict the outcomes of the previous 40 years of deficits and ballooning national debt. I don't think his ideas were as groundbreaking as sometimes assumed. He had lived through an entire generation breaking the rules, and simply proposed that after 40 years of it, perhaps this could continue quite a while longer. Arthur Laffer was a radical. Mosler not so much.
The historically brief 2021-23 inflation surge only happened amid a global pandemic when helicopter money was employed. This distribution of cash was different than previous federal deficits, or even the bank bailouts of 2008-2009, because it went directly to working class people with the greatest propensity to spend. Turns out it matters where the helicopter drops the money.
So perhaps the lower economic classes will never again get a Keynesian stimulus like that in the next crisis, unless the economy is mired in deflation. For regular recessions and liquidity crunches, I expect policymakers to return to the 2008-2009 script, which is remembered as working perfectly even if it was followed by years of lackluster growth. Nonetheless, MMM is now a dead topic and people are back to thinking in the old monetarist framework that was discredited a generation ago because we don't have any other working models of inflation.