Ukraine

[MustacheAndaHalf]

I've seen maps of airfields that Ukraine isn't allowed to attack, owing to U.S. restrictions.  Ukraine pushing into Russia might technically allow them to hit Russian bombers (on the ground) using ATCAMS, while still following those restrictions.

It could also be a way to pressure Russia to move forces North, away from the territory Ukraine wants to recapture in the South.  Looking at maps of Russia, it might also force Russian supply lines to lengthen, in order to avoid the area Ukraine has taken.  I guess we'll see if this opens up anything in the southern front.

[blue_green_sparks]

No worries for the clueless Kursk evacuees fleeing the region. Putin promised them 10k rubbles for their trouble. They can't understand why the vicious Ukrainians are doing this to them, but hey that's $112.80 hard cash. They'll be fine.

[Radagast]

I'm giving Ukraine six months at best. They are in an attritional war with Russia, crowned Heavyweight champion of "Throw Men at the Problem til the Problem goes away." And the the general in command of Ukraine thinks he can put attrition Russia.

Mk, see ya in six months.

Just remembered this post. Should we wait 6 more days though just to be offishul?

If it wasn't for misinformation, Cawl wouldn't have no information at all.

[ChpBstrd]

The Ukrainian incursion makes me nervous for the Ukrainians. For the past 2 years they were able to inflict asymmetrical damage on a much larger opponent because they were playing defense instead of launching offensive attacks. Apparently the accepted wisdom is that an attacker should expect 3x the losses as the defender.

But now they are the invaders in a foreign land, without protection from trenches, minefields, or infrastructure under their control. Shouldn't we expect the Ukrainians in the same situation to suffer 3x the losses as the Russians?

I only played the Risk board game a couple of times, and while drinking of course, as one does, and noticed invading Russia almost always led to disaster.

Hopefully they can get to within shelling distance or airstrike distance of war factories in Belgorod or Kursk, inflict some damage, and then pull back to Ukrainian borders to defend against the Russian brigades being transported away from the front to the Kursk region from behind trenches, minefields, barbed wire, artillery, and air defenses.

But I fear that instead of this outcome, the Russian brigades will simply invade Ukraine to the east of the incursion in a bid to encircle them. It's what I'd do if I was playing Risk on that side, because it would create a dilemma for the Ukrainians and force them to give up territory they conquered. Ukraine has to get out before that happens.

[Telecaster]

I've read differing analysis about what Ukraine is hoping to achieve with this, but it appears that Russians were caught by surprise and so Ukraine was able to advance relatively quickly against weak opposition.  Putting on my armchair general hat, Ukraine has reportedly captured about 100 square miles of Russian territory.   Russia must respond.  If Ukraine were able to dig in and build defensive emplacements, it could be quite difficult for Russia.  We've seen that Russia is able to make slow, incremental gains vs. Ukraine.   But recapturing this much ground might take many months.   If Russia has to fight in Russia, it can't fight as effectively in Ukraine.   

[nereo]

But now they are the invaders in a foreign land, without protection from trenches, minefields, or infrastructure under their control. Shouldn't we expect the Ukrainians in the same situation to suffer 3x the losses as the Russians?

My understanding is that this 3x generalization is for capturing a fortified position.  The rule falls apart when there's not an adequate number of troops or fortifications to put up a coherent defense.

I'm not sure we can count the Kursk region as "fortified" in the traditional sense (and owing to how easily Ukraine gained over 100 km2 in a few short days).

[reeshau]

I also read an interesting theory that Russia may have been planning an incursion from Kursk, and Ukraine headed them off.  That would explain the mass surrenders: a lot of Russian soldiers there,  but not in place for defense--rather, staging for offense.

I do think this group needs to stay mobile to accomplish its mission.  If they stay put, they will be targets for airstrikes and artillery.

[waltworks]

They're conducting combined arms ops against the absolute dregs of the Russian Army, because the "good" ones are at the main front.

If they were throwing troops at pointless trench/minefield charges you'd see massive losses.

Now, it's probably still pointless and most likely more of a propaganda exercise than anything, and it will probably lead to nothing significant, but it's not just throwing away troops.

-W

[rocketpj]

Russia has apparently discovered that they aren't the only ones 'allowed' to invade the territory of their neighbours.  Apparently they felt so secure they didn't bother building decent defenses.  Good for Ukraine for exposing that weakness.  Among other things, that forces Russia to expend resources to beef up their defense everywhere along the border, not just at locations of their choosing.

[LennStar]

But now they are the invaders in a foreign land, without protection from trenches, minefields, or infrastructure under their control. Shouldn't we expect the Ukrainians in the same situation to suffer 3x the losses as the Russians?

My understanding is that this 3x generalization is for capturing a fortified position.  The rule falls apart when there's not an adequate number of troops or fortifications to put up a coherent defense.

I'm not sure we can count the Kursk region as "fortified" in the traditional sense (and owing to how easily Ukraine gained over 100 km2 in a few short days).

Half correct. The 3x and 10x for cities are not losses (though that often happens) but the numerical advantage you need to win.

2x for open field battle, where the defender has no or only rudimentary, temporary defenses. 3x for fortified positions the defender has erected (like mine fields) and artillery in position etc. 5 times for something like the main defense line in a good position that has been prepared for months (mine fields, fire tables, bunkers...)

Now, it's probably still pointless and most likely more of a propaganda exercise than anything, and it will probably lead to nothing significant, but it's not just throwing away troops.

I think it's a lot more. Russia has been throwing all it has against Ukraine for half a year now and in the last weeks we have seen increasing gains. Still small, but the accelerating rate even after the new artillery munition arrived is not a good thing.
(That said Russia has only reached the main fortified line at 2 points. Which might have been a bit of the reason Ukraine did that now.)

That Russia was able to do that was mainly because of their overwhelming numbers. Along the whole front we have indeed that 3x or even more relation. So you can imagine how concentrated it is in some parts.
But Ukraine has started to recruit more soldiers a bit back and I think those units attacking now are those - western trained, probably western equipment, but still very green.

Put them into the stalemate battle with the other units or let them get experience against an unprepared enemy, in a new field, where they can act freely?
Stretch the Russians so they have to relocate troops from the attacks that have Ukrainians struggle heavily at the moment?
Get some pressure on Putin for the rumored peace talks? Make it look to the more important western Russians that they might be in danger?
Get the morale up both in the country and international that is down?

Do not ask what is the reason for a certain move. Ask what are the reasonS for it. Strategy is never about only one goal. It's how to get to several goals in one move. 
That is why Go is still mandatory game for Chinese officiers. It teaches you exactly that.
There is a famous move https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ear-reddening_game - have a look at that. Even if you know nothing about the game, it should be visible that the "ear reddening move" marked with 1 connectes the whole board - it connects 3 sides and prevents white connecting left and right. That is strategy, a single move that redefines the whole situation. While being far away from any front.
And I think Ukraine is trying something similar here. The stillness of Ukraine and the visible panic on the Russian side is reassuring for me they might be ablet o pull something like that off.

[Travis]

Looks like Ukraine has advanced about 30km into Russia. I've seen videos showing at least 100 POWs and the aftermath of a Russian infantry company that stopped on the side of the road in their trucks and was almost completely destroyed by rocket strikes with reported casualties between 150 and 300 along with photos/videos of some destroyed/abandoned tanks. There are elements of three mechanized brigades involved with rumors of additional reinforcements.

This whole area looks like it was lightly defended by conscript infantry with minimal armor support. What's the point of this attack? No idea. Everyone I've talked to who follows this war (some of them hourly) can only speculate on the purpose. So far Ukrainian casualties appear very low, and Russian resistance is scattered and thin with little air support. As it turns out, in the last week Ukraine leveled the ammo storages of two airfields with drones that could have been used against this attack. It'll be interesting to see how this plays out as Russian offensives in southern Donetsk continue to claw forward a few hundred meters per day, though attacks by Russian forces overall appear to have plummeted since the start of this attack.

Ukrainian forces also crossed the border 100km south and took the village of Poroz (looks like 100 people live there). So far it's just a data point, but someone decided it'd be a good idea to attack into Russia somewhere else. That information is about 2 hours old so we'll see if it means anything tomorrow.

[Radagast]

Minna Ålander:
- catch Russia off guard and bring the war to Russians in a way they haven’t experienced before
- make Putin look stupid and hopefully generate discontent
- boost morale in Ukraine
- kill morale in Russia
- seize control of the information sphere
- show the west that Russia can be attacked without it resulting in WW3
- reassure western supporters that Ukraine can win this war
- put an end to the recently increased talk about when would be a good time to start negotiating by mixing up the front line
- tactically, to force Russia to move troops in a way that opens possibilities for Ukraine elsewhere
- Finally, and most importantly: the Kursk operation potentially changes the whole tradeoff Russia has assumed the war is about. In the eventuality that Ukraine manages to hold this territory for a longer period of time, Russia might have to trade Ukrainian territory for its own.

https://x.com/minna_alander/status/1821998911357100158

[ChpBstrd]

Here's a quick study on possible motives:

1) Divert resources from Karkhiv, which is almost in artillery range
2) Seize land for future negotiations (see digging in operations)
3) Control Gazprom hub (but... Ukraine already controls pipes)
4) Morale boost (see Tet offensive)
5) Cut off a key rail line
6) Seize the Kursk nuclear power plant and create an energy crisis for Russia

[Radagast]

3) Gazprom hub is probably the dumbest, as the pipe apparently runs 1000's of km through Ukraine. I never saw any reason for suggesting this.
6) Kursk NPP seems like a good one, but I'd be amazed if Ukraine actually has the resource advantage to achieve this. This seems a stretch goal at best for this year.

Others I've thought of not mentioned:
1) strike directly at conscripts, a politically sensitive part of the military not allowed by law to fight in Ukraine.
2) at least a part of the war will now be fucking up Russian land and towns rather than Ukrainian, which will effect economic results and eventually rebuilding costs.
3) create a Russian refugee crisis for the first time
4) Thus far there has been a huge asymmetrical element to the border, with Ukraine forced to deploy enormous resources to defend every inch, and Russia neglecting it entirely to put all resources into taking land in Ukraine when and where they will. In fact if they are allowed to, then there's no sense in Ukraine even fighting for their own land if they can just walk in and take 10x more Russian land for the same cost. Now Russia will be forced to either give up large amounts of territory, or expend huge resources defending the whole border. Either way it will make things a lot harder for Russia going forward.

Finally, it's crazy the deference which has been shown to Russia that no one has even bothered to attack them until now. In historical wars adjoining European countries would all have been marching off to battle in support of Ukraine, and trying to seize as much of Russia as they could. Finland and Norway would be working on the Kola Peninsula, Poland would be after Kaliningrad, the Baltics would be establishing buffer zones, Austria would be in it for the lulz, and more. Now, they're all deescalating, leaving the doors open for future cooperation, trying not to antagonize Russia, insisting weapons may only be used in Ukraine, minding their own business, and such.

[rocketpj]

Now, they're all deescalating, leaving the doors open for future cooperation, trying not to antagonize Russia, insisting weapons may only be used in Ukraine, minding their own business, and such.

Nukes have a way of demotivating potential invaders.

[Telecaster]

At this point it feels a bit like Doolittle's Tokyo raid.   Tactically, not that big of a deal, but strategically huge.  Russia is now forced to counter this invasion.  Although Russia has an enormous advantage of troops and equipment, there are still limits.   Even if Ukraine withdraws fully, Russia must reinforce this part of the border indefinitely.   That comes at an operational cost elsewhere along the front. 

[Radagast]

Now, they're all deescalating, leaving the doors open for future cooperation, trying not to antagonize Russia, insisting weapons may only be used in Ukraine, minding their own business, and such.

Nukes have a way of demotivating potential invaders.

Eh, overused threat. If Russia's legitimate security interests include invading an ever expanding ring of countries and that can never be reversed (which it's neighbors claim will happen, and that's been the trend albeit based on a very small number) then they'll have to do something about it sooner or later, and may as well be sooner.

[MustacheAndaHalf]

Here's a quick study on possible motives:
4) Morale boost (see Tet offensive)

The cities captured by North Vietnamese forces were defended initially by South Vietnamese, who "usually drove the attackers out within two or three days, sometimes within hours".  The loss estimates for North Vietnamese range from 32,000 to 48,000 killed (7x to 10x more than South Vietnamese plus U.S. losses).  Losing captured cities within hours/days while taking stunning losses isn't a morale boost.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tet_Offensive

If one objective in attacking Kursk was Putin's embarrassment, that succeeded.  This embarrassment grows the longer Ukraine holds Russian territory, so Russia is likely to make some bad military decisions to fix the political situation.

[MustacheAndaHalf]

Now, they're all deescalating, leaving the doors open for future cooperation, trying not to antagonize Russia, insisting weapons may only be used in Ukraine, minding their own business, and such.

Nukes have a way of demotivating potential invaders.

I hope Europe is starting to realize Russia doesn't actually do anything when an escalation occurs.  Most recently, numerous countries have committed F-16s to Ukraine, to which a Russian diplomat claimed it wouldn't change anything on the battlefield.  Some escalation!  And the same with artillery, longer range artillery, tanks, etc.  It's always an escalation, and always nothing happens.  Threats are a cheap way for Russia to slow down assistance to Ukraine.

Nuclear missiles are very expensive to maintain, and Russia runs on corruption.  It's a very lucrative combination, so I assume some percentage of Russian nukes have turned into duds as people lined their own pockets with the maintenance money.  If Putin launches one of Russia's nuclear missiles, he's taking an unknown risk of being embarrassed when nothing happens.  If he only threatens, he doesn't have to find out.

[blue_green_sparks]

I think the amount of damage a very resourceful Ukraine has managed to inflict upon the Russian military is astounding. Did the experts back in 2022 predict anything like what is happening now? Putin's main justification for his special operation was to create a territorial buffer to defend Russian borders against an expanding NATO. This incursion into Kursk seems like a wicked slap to his face. His imperialist concept that Russians and Ukrainians are one and the same is proven to be nonsense.

[ChpBstrd]

3) Gazprom hub is probably the dumbest, as the pipe apparently runs 1000's of km through Ukraine. I never saw any reason for suggesting this.

Apparently this hub is where gas is split along pipelines leading to various countries like Hungary and Slovakia. It is the point where Russia controls how much gas goes to each of their various customers. In theory, Ukrainian control means Ukraine can tell these customers "you pay me for the gas now" while they tell Russia "you sell gas to us now, if you want to sell any gas at all."

If Russia refuses these terms, well... they'll have no way to control or measure the flow of gas to each customer. "Uh, did you get 5 million BTUs out of our pipeline or 4?"

The only other option is for Russia to cut off their customers, some of whom have semi-friendly governments, and lose billions in badly needed revenue. This is a classic "create dilemmas for your adversary, not problems" situation. Problems can be solved, but dilemmas are tradeoffs with bad outcomes no matter what choice you make.

Thus instead of fighting to the death while Russia profits from the gas lines transit-ting their country, the Ukrainians could grab a chunk of those profits while negating the point of support for Russia in Slovakia, Hungary, the Balkans, etc. If Russia cuts them off this winter, that's on Russia. If Ukraine is the country selling the gas, then why support Russia?

Nuclear missiles are very expensive to maintain, and Russia runs on corruption.  It's a very lucrative combination, so I assume some percentage of Russian nukes have turned into duds as people lined their own pockets with the maintenance money.  If Putin launches one of Russia's nuclear missiles, he's taking an unknown risk of being embarrassed when nothing happens.  If he only threatens, he doesn't have to find out.

Russia is likely to make some bad military decisions to fix the political situation.

The consequence of launching a dud nuclear missile may extend beyond embarrassment. NATO could launch a retaliatory strike with non-duds before the Russian missile even landed. Also, if NATO realized that some significant number of Russian nukes were duds, Russia would lose significant deterrence and NATO's assumptions for winning a pre-emptive attack would make more sense. NATO might even consider it urgent to attack Russia now rather than waiting for them to fix their weapon/corruption problems.

Imagine Russia sending a nuke to Kiev (probably ICBM to reduce the risk of it being shot down) and Kiev getting a pile of debris like we've seen with other dud missiles.

[waltworks]

When you have thousands of nukes it doesn't matter if some of them are duds.

That said, nukes have been an empty threat the whole time.

-W

[Radagast]

3) Gazprom hub is probably the dumbest, as the pipe apparently runs 1000's of km through Ukraine. I never saw any reason for suggesting this.

Apparently this hub is where gas is split along pipelines leading to various countries like Hungary and Slovakia. It is the point where Russia controls how much gas goes to each of their various customers. In theory, Ukrainian control means Ukraine can tell these customers "you pay me for the gas now" while they tell Russia "you sell gas to us now, if you want to sell any gas at all."

If Russia refuses these terms, well... they'll have no way to control or measure the flow of gas to each customer. "Uh, did you get 5 million BTUs out of our pipeline or 4?"

The only other option is for Russia to cut off their customers, some of whom have semi-friendly governments, and lose billions in badly needed revenue. This is a classic "create dilemmas for your adversary, not problems" situation. Problems can be solved, but dilemmas are tradeoffs with bad outcomes no matter what choice you make.

Thus instead of fighting to the death while Russia profits from the gas lines transit-ting their country, the Ukrainians could grab a chunk of those profits while negating the point of support for Russia in Slovakia, Hungary, the Balkans, etc. If Russia cuts them off this winter, that's on Russia. If Ukraine is the country selling the gas, then why support Russia?

If a thousand miles of pipe run through your country, you could definitely find a way to tap in a control valve and meter for a nominal cost. For a pipe that long there are probably numerous isolation valves in Ukraine, and even a booster station or two. Also, my understanding has been that throughout the war Russia has still been leasing the pipe from Ukraine for $2B a year. Ukraine has always been in full control of the gas flowing through their country.

Edit: looked it up as I've done air and especially water but no gas, and didn't know how similar they were. There are likely a dozen or more booster stations for this pipe in Ukraine. That means the only reason the gas is still flowing is because Ukraine has been very actively maintaining these stations. They could easily do nothing and the flow would quickly stop all on its own.

[markbike528CBX]

While I have no idea what Ukrainian goal for the offensive into Russia are, I would note that the https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wagner_Group_rebellion stretched from Rostov-on-the Don right along the border to ‘near’ Moscow.  This might have indicated to the Ukrainians that the Russian forces were/are thin in the near border region and presented a tempting target.

[big_owl]

3) Gazprom hub is probably the dumbest, as the pipe apparently runs 1000's of km through Ukraine. I never saw any reason for suggesting this.

Apparently this hub is where gas is split along pipelines leading to various countries like Hungary and Slovakia. It is the point where Russia controls how much gas goes to each of their various customers. In theory, Ukrainian control means Ukraine can tell these customers "you pay me for the gas now" while they tell Russia "you sell gas to us now, if you want to sell any gas at all."

If Russia refuses these terms, well... they'll have no way to control or measure the flow of gas to each customer. "Uh, did you get 5 million BTUs out of our pipeline or 4?"

The only other option is for Russia to cut off their customers, some of whom have semi-friendly governments, and lose billions in badly needed revenue. This is a classic "create dilemmas for your adversary, not problems" situation. Problems can be solved, but dilemmas are tradeoffs with bad outcomes no matter what choice you make.

Thus instead of fighting to the death while Russia profits from the gas lines transit-ting their country, the Ukrainians could grab a chunk of those profits while negating the point of support for Russia in Slovakia, Hungary, the Balkans, etc. If Russia cuts them off this winter, that's on Russia. If Ukraine is the country selling the gas, then why support Russia?

If a thousand miles of pipe run through your country, you could definitely find a way to tap in a control valve and meter for a nominal cost. For a pipe that long there are probably numerous isolation valves in Ukraine, and even a booster station or two. Also, my understanding has been that throughout the war Russia has still been leasing the pipe from Ukraine for $2B a year. Ukraine has always been in full control of the gas flowing through their country.

Edit: looked it up as I've done air and especially water but no gas, and didn't know how similar they were. There are likely a dozen or more booster stations for this pipe in Ukraine. That means the only reason the gas is still flowing is because Ukraine has been very actively maintaining these stations. They could easily do nothing and the flow would quickly stop all on its own.

I do those for a living.  They surely have a number of compressor stations along the pipeline, either powered by electric motors, recips or gas turbines.   They could easily shut the pipeline down....but then Ukraine would no longer get paid to transport gas and they would quickly lose any goodwill they are getting from the downstream countries the pipeline is feeding.   They probably also have extensive force majeure penalties build into their contracts.  Theyre already effectively bankrupt so it's probably not a good idea to cut off that cash flow. 

[zolotiyeruki]

Here's a quick study on possible motives:
4) Morale boost (see Tet offensive)

The cities captured by North Vietnamese forces were defended initially by South Vietnamese, who "usually drove the attackers out within two or three days, sometimes within hours".  The loss estimates for North Vietnamese range from 32,000 to 48,000 killed (7x to 10x more than South Vietnamese plus U.S. losses).  Losing captured cities within hours/days while taking stunning losses isn't a morale boost.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tet_Offensive

If one objective in attacking Kursk was Putin's embarrassment, that succeeded.  This embarrassment grows the longer Ukraine holds Russian territory, so Russia is likely to make some bad military decisions to fix the political situation.

You're absolutely right that from a purely tactical perspective, the Tet offensive was a failure. However (at least the way I heard it), it "made God bleed," and undermined public support for the war in the US.

[Travis]

While I have no idea what Ukrainian goal for the offensive into Russia are, I would note that the https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wagner_Group_rebellion stretched from Rostov-on-the Don right along the border to ‘near’ Moscow.  This might have indicated to the Ukrainians that the Russian forces were/are thin in the near border region and presented a tempting target.

The border area that was breached appears to have been guarded by lightly armed and barely-trained conscripts - the kind that get drafted every year and aren't supposed to be in Ukraine so they've been getting all the other duties in the army. Prisoners are numbering in the hundreds. Russia is pushing pieces of veteran units into the area and Ukraine is still taking ground. There's been some back and forth in a couple places, but this offensive isn't over yet.

[cerat0n1a]

When you have thousands of nukes it doesn't matter if some of them are duds.

I've heard a variation on this from air force officers in the UK numerous times over the years. Most of the Russian nuclear missiles don't work. Most of Russia's missile sites will be taken out by NATO before they can launch in the event of a hot war. But even 1% of them getting through is still very bad.

[LennStar]

And look at it from the intelligence side: If even the Russians don't know which work, nobody can do a targeted first strike.

[MustacheAndaHalf]

zolotiyeruki - I agree the Tet Offensive was a political victory, eventually, but my point was that it didn't provide an immediate morale boost like Ukraine is receiving from the Kursk offensive.

Russia's Kursk region looked like it was bombed, with shattered windows and ruined roads.
And then the Ukrainians attacked...

(hopefully I recalled that joke, from Twitter, correctly)

[dividendman]

A couple things are interesting about this offensive:
#1. Russian tactics to dislodge the Ukrainians are basically to bomb the crap out of everything with planes and artillery strikes, then move in troops. On enemy territory it seems OK, but blowing up all of your own territory just to regain it is tough, especially when you send your citizens back to rubble.
#2. Russia has poor defenses on the border, can Ukraine do other incursions and create some havoc in Russia? We'll see.

[Radagast]

#1. Russian tactics to dislodge the Ukrainians are basically to bomb the crap out of everything with planes and artillery strikes, then move in troops. On enemy territory it seems OK, but blowing up all of your own territory just to regain it is tough, especially when you send your citizens back to rubble.

That's what I think... worst case for Ukraine, they likely defend one or two of the larger settlements and let Russia level them.

Other interesting things on my mind: by number of troops reportedly committed this is the smallest big offensive of the war by a good margin. Ukraine sent in about 1/4 of what they had sent toward Kherson or Zaporizhia (sp?) in 2022 or 2023. It's like 1/6 of what Russia has used in their attempts to capture any settlements. Imagine if they had 10x that number (but that would have probably been impossible to conceal).

Equipment losses are roughly 1:1 for this, similar to last summer. But I get the impression that personnel losses greatly favor Ukraine so far.

Another reason un mentioned for Ukraine to do this:
Russia is terrible at dealing with unexpected events. They have no Plan B (ever) and it takes around a month for them to think of one.

[ChpBstrd]

Another reason un mentioned for Ukraine to do this:
Russia is terrible at dealing with unexpected events. They have no Plan B (ever) and it takes around a month for them to think of one.

I've thought about this too, and imagined Putin angrily ordering his generals to "find more soldiers" to blitz the existing battle lines in the East. They comply with the order. Now Putin is yelling at them for not securing the border with those same troops Putin ordered them to send to Eastern Ukraine. Nazi Germany ran into the same fallacy, as Hitler began taking an interest in dictating specific battles and diverting resources toward pet projects like the holocaust and the world's biggest cannon. What we're seeing is another historical indictment of top-down one-man leadership.

I saw a video recently of Kursk residents pleading directly to Vladimir Putin to send aid. The commentary was that the people don't trust their local government, and place the blame for false propaganda on local officials, but they imagine their god-like leader swooping in to fix things even at the level of their small town. This is what it means to have a cult of personality.

Perhaps Putin cultivates this idea that all problems are at the local level and all solutions come from him. He does so through firing people when things don't go well (cough...cough...The Apprentice), solving little possibly staged problems for callers on his show, rewriting the history of mistakes such as by saying the West started the Ukraine war, and by doing things like blaming military defeats on the troops. It seems to work on at least some people in the information-starved environment of Southwest Russia.

Perhaps none of us can possibly think anything other than what we're exposed to. What's curious is how many people remain true believers even as the fiction collapses around them. It's time to read Orwell.

[reeshau]

On enemy territory it seems OK, but blowing up all of your own territory just to regain it is tough, especially when you send your citizens back to rubble.

Cynical, I wonder if that's why they bothered to evacuate civilians.  With nobody to witness, they can blame the destruction on Ukraine.

[GuitarStv]

It's time to read Orwell.

It's always time to read Orwell.  What a great writer.  Superficially, Orwell was very anti-socialist in his writing . . . but an awful lot of the worst things that he foresaw as the result of socialism have happened under capitalist rules.  I think that it was authoritarian tendencies that he was really trying to rail against in 1984 and Animal Farm.

[Telecaster]

It's always time to read Orwell.  What a great writer.  Superficially, Orwell was very anti-socialist in his writing . . . but an awful lot of the worst things that he foresaw as the result of socialism have happened under capitalist rules.  I think that it was authoritarian tendencies that he was really trying to rail against in 1984 and Animal Farm.

Orwell was a dedicated socialist. He saw socialism as a power-to-the people movement that would counteract totalitarianism.   

[Travis]

Another reason un mentioned for Ukraine to do this:
Russia is terrible at dealing with unexpected events. They have no Plan B (ever) and it takes around a month for them to think of one.

I've thought about this too, and imagined Putin angrily ordering his generals to "find more soldiers" to blitz the existing battle lines in the East. They comply with the order. Now Putin is yelling at them for not securing the border with those same troops Putin ordered them to send to Eastern Ukraine. Nazi Germany ran into the same fallacy, as Hitler began taking an interest in dictating specific battles and diverting resources toward pet projects like the holocaust and the world's biggest cannon. What we're seeing is another historical indictment of top-down one-man leadership.

I saw a video recently of Kursk residents pleading directly to Vladimir Putin to send aid. The commentary was that the people don't trust their local government, and place the blame for false propaganda on local officials, but they imagine their god-like leader swooping in to fix things even at the level of their small town. This is what it means to have a cult of personality.

Perhaps Putin cultivates this idea that all problems are at the local level and all solutions come from him. He does so through firing people when things don't go well (cough...cough...The Apprentice), solving little possibly staged problems for callers on his show, rewriting the history of mistakes such as by saying the West started the Ukraine war, and by doing things like blaming military defeats on the troops. It seems to work on at least some people in the information-starved environment of Southwest Russia.

Perhaps none of us can possibly think anything other than what we're exposed to. What's curious is how many people remain true believers even as the fiction collapses around them. It's time to read Orwell.

One of today's memes read "This week a NATO-equipped army is distributing aid to Russians citizens."

[Glenstache]

Another reason un mentioned for Ukraine to do this:
Russia is terrible at dealing with unexpected events. They have no Plan B (ever) and it takes around a month for them to think of one.

I've thought about this too, and imagined Putin angrily ordering his generals to "find more soldiers" to blitz the existing battle lines in the East. They comply with the order. Now Putin is yelling at them for not securing the border with those same troops Putin ordered them to send to Eastern Ukraine. Nazi Germany ran into the same fallacy, as Hitler began taking an interest in dictating specific battles and diverting resources toward pet projects like the holocaust and the world's biggest cannon. What we're seeing is another historical indictment of top-down one-man leadership.

I saw a video recently of Kursk residents pleading directly to Vladimir Putin to send aid. The commentary was that the people don't trust their local government, and place the blame for false propaganda on local officials, but they imagine their god-like leader swooping in to fix things even at the level of their small town. This is what it means to have a cult of personality.

Perhaps Putin cultivates this idea that all problems are at the local level and all solutions come from him. He does so through firing people when things don't go well (cough...cough...The Apprentice), solving little possibly staged problems for callers on his show, rewriting the history of mistakes such as by saying the West started the Ukraine war, and by doing things like blaming military defeats on the troops. It seems to work on at least some people in the information-starved environment of Southwest Russia.

Perhaps none of us can possibly think anything other than what we're exposed to. What's curious is how many people remain true believers even as the fiction collapses around them. It's time to read Orwell.

This reminds me of people being on ventilators in the ICU during the peak of the pandemic and convinced that they didn't have covid because they were wrapped up in the conspiracy-sphere. Or Q-anon. These tendencies are not limited to Russia.

"Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother".

[Dancin'Dog]

Here's a report saying Ukraine is ready to accept Russian refugees from Kursk. 






https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zna5N1Tqtlg

[ChpBstrd]

Another reason un mentioned for Ukraine to do this:
Russia is terrible at dealing with unexpected events. They have no Plan B (ever) and it takes around a month for them to think of one.

I've thought about this too, and imagined Putin angrily ordering his generals to "find more soldiers" to blitz the existing battle lines in the East. They comply with the order. Now Putin is yelling at them for not securing the border with those same troops Putin ordered them to send to Eastern Ukraine. Nazi Germany ran into the same fallacy, as Hitler began taking an interest in dictating specific battles and diverting resources toward pet projects like the holocaust and the world's biggest cannon. What we're seeing is another historical indictment of top-down one-man leadership.

I saw a video recently of Kursk residents pleading directly to Vladimir Putin to send aid. The commentary was that the people don't trust their local government, and place the blame for false propaganda on local officials, but they imagine their god-like leader swooping in to fix things even at the level of their small town. This is what it means to have a cult of personality.

Perhaps Putin cultivates this idea that all problems are at the local level and all solutions come from him. He does so through firing people when things don't go well (cough...cough...The Apprentice), solving little possibly staged problems for callers on his show, rewriting the history of mistakes such as by saying the West started the Ukraine war, and by doing things like blaming military defeats on the troops. It seems to work on at least some people in the information-starved environment of Southwest Russia.

Perhaps none of us can possibly think anything other than what we're exposed to. What's curious is how many people remain true believers even as the fiction collapses around them. It's time to read Orwell.

This reminds me of people being on ventilators in the ICU during the peak of the pandemic and convinced that they didn't have covid because they were wrapped up in the conspiracy-sphere. Or Q-anon. These tendencies are not limited to Russia.

"Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother".

Yea that's an image that in my own case brought Orwell further out of the realm of fiction writer describing his own unique historical experiences that might never occur again and closer to the realm of political scientist who was right and will continue to be right about certain mistakes humans tend to make for innate reasons.

Orwell was certainly shaped by his time as a communist and watching that movement devolve from high ideals to paranoid murder spree, but I think it would be a mistake to conflate his later ideas with the modern political left and right. The modern far left is for economic egalitarianism like the leftists of the 1930s, but does not generally support concentrations of political power or government-imposed conformity like the commies did. The modern far right generally supports concentrations of political power and government-imposed conformity like the commies did, but supports economic policies that lead to vast differences in wealth including poverty.

So was Orwell an anti-authoritarian writer? That's my read. The promises of egalitarianism on the left or orderliness/unity on the right can be used as justifications for dictatorship, but it's the dictatorship itself that is the problem. Dictatorships inherently exploit the people and warp the truth, regardless of what slogans they used to seize power. Putin's right-wing rants against gays and foreigners, or his affinity for the official church did not produce a significantly different outcome than communist China, Cuba, or the old Soviet Union. Ideology is just an excuse that leads to dictatorship.

[Dancin'Dog]

Any updates or info about the Moscow drone attacks?

[dividendman]

Any updates or info about the Moscow drone attacks?

My guess is they didn't do much since there are no stories from Russian or Western media on it besides the fact that some were launched towards Moscow.

[Dancin'Dog]

Any updates or info about the Moscow drone attacks?

My guess is they didn't do much since there are no stories from Russian or Western media on it besides the fact that some were launched towards Moscow.

It has to have had at least some psychological damage.  The capital should be untouchable, right?

[Tyson]

Any updates or info about the Moscow drone attacks?

My guess is they didn't do much since there are no stories from Russian or Western media on it besides the fact that some were launched towards Moscow.

It has to have had at least some psychological damage.  The capital should be untouchable, right?

The capital is very much vulnerable.  Mostly due to it's close location to the western border.  This makes it quite vulnerable to invaders from the east (ie, from Europe), which has happened in the past more than once.  This geographic vulnerability is, IMO, the reason Russia wants to expand eastward, to have basically 'buffer zones'.

[Travis]

The oil storage at Proletarsk in Rostov has been burning for four days. Half of the 70-something storage tanks are burned or burning and new ones are still catching. One estimate was that this was over $100 million worth of diesel that will probably be written off.

https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1826213659137245206

An airfield in Murmansk (yes, go ahead and measure the flight time on that one) was attacked by an A-22 light plane drone yesterday. No damage, but that spooked them.

In the last few hours, the Oktyabrskoye airfield in Volgograd was hit by multiple drones.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1826432795121480120?s=19

Ukrainian forces are still slowly pushing the line out in nearly all directions in Kursk. Verified Russian POWs in excess of 500. And Russian railroads are still in total chaos trying to find the wagons to move reinforcements and supplies to this new sector.

[LennStar]

Russian Milbloggers say Ukraine has now gone into Bryansk oblast. There are also signs for other invorsions happening in hhe near future (maybe Ukraine day of independence that is on the 24th.)

It could be that Ukraine tries to overwhelm defensive troops and force Russia to relocate their attack force to defend hundreds of km of border.
Though that comes with a price. Russia, at least at the moment, is still advancing ever faster in the Donetsk area. Niu-York has fallen for example and several places are in acute danger of being surrounded and will need to be evacuated. That is very likely the result of elite troops having been moved out for hte Ukrainian attacks.

This month might be a turning point as important as the Ukrainian Charkiv offensive in 2022. And I would only give it a 50/50 at most, though Ukrainian general staff have shown in the past that they know what they are doing strategically. 

Personally I am most interested in the South, where nothing big has happened for months. Russian logostics there are still vulnerable to a deep strike, and I doubt the defenses there are as manned as they were last summer when the attack awas officially announced a quarter before.

While this is a deeply troubling situation for Russia, it also means heavy losses for Ukraines best troops.

[Just Joe]

And Russian railroads are still in total chaos trying to find the wagons to move reinforcements and supplies to this new sector.

Hopefully the Russian RR are a target too? Take out all the locomotives possible?

[Radagast]

Russian Milbloggers say Ukraine has now gone into Bryansk oblast. There are also signs for other invorsions happening in hhe near future (maybe Ukraine day of independence that is on the 24th.)

It seems like the Russians have been saying this every day about every part of the line since Ukraine first invaded though. I didn't check for a couple days, did anything actually happen?

It would fit though. Ukraine has been doing an extensive and seemingly effective deep strike campaign for the past weeks. Mark Hertling observed that the tiny Ukrainian invasion looks more like a proof of concept or practice run than the main event, but I wouldn't know. So it is plausible a big Ukrainian offensive is about to start.

[Just Joe]

Saw that Belarus has staged it's military along the Ukrainian border. Do they really want to do that?

[Dancin'Dog]

I don't know what the Ukranians targeted in Moscow, but I'd think the bridges would be good targets there too. 


I've lived in the mountains and it's a big deal when they do bridge repairs, and you happen to live on the wrong side of the bridge.  30-minute detours every day for 6-12 months suck, even in peace times.


A city would be crippled with a few major bridges down.