A 60/40, 70/25 or reverse equity glidepath are already diversified.
One can add international exposure to the stocks and bonds components if there is a desire to further diversify based on US specific risk.
The Cederburg study finds that international with home country bias gives a better return, mainly because bonds, long-term, cannot keep up with inflation, and thus drag down the portfolio.
This is why I emphasise directly-held TIPS, which might keep up better with inflation and would give you coupons and principle protection in the event of a crash during interest rate increases (such as what we had recently).
As I understand, the scenario you are proposing is that a 1.7% withdrawal rate cannot be sustained with any of those portfolios. This has never happened, so you are discussing an event worse than the Great Depression. If that happened, I don't think you could rely on US annuities or US government pensions either. An international weighting may help in this scenario, but that isn't guaranteed either.
I believe it has happened more often than just the Great Depression. According to the Cederburg study, there's a 5% risk of total loss. Yikes!
Reverse equity glidepaths do not solve all problems, in some scenarios a static allocation like 60/40 or 75/25 will do better. Karsten concludes that reverse equity glidepaths are most effective when CAPE is above 20.
I guess ERN / Karsten's approach is different from Cederburg's and that's why they get different results. I'm not really sure who to believe. Probably I should investigate Karsten more.
Isn't this also based on historical data, which might not necessarily repeat?
Sure, what other method would you use for modeling purposes if 100 years of stock market data cannot be relied upon to create a basic foundation for the portfolio?
My understanding is that Cederburg & co uses a "block bootstrap simulation". So they take historical data as a starting point, but then use it to build some kind of random simulations, and then measure which % of those simulations succeed vs. fail.
This is supposed to remove certain biases, e.g. survivorship bias.
One problem though - maybe this suffers from what Taleb calls the "ludic fallacy". Even though it's randomised, you're still using the historical data as input. This means you're limiting the
range of possible outcomes to what is capture in the historical data. But there's no reason the future should be anything like the past. So the future could have wildly different outcomes.
I guess making predictions is really hard, especially about the future. 😄
The paper you referenced earlier states that a 0.80% withdrawal rate is needed to achieve 1% probability of failure. To me, that is a red flag. Since 1972, a money market fund would have returned 0.6% real return and no risk. I'm guessing the failures in this paper driving the withdrawals rates so low were due to heavy weighting in a specific country that lost a war while drawing down the portfolio. Without the details of the specific failure cases i.e. time frame, portfolio composition, this is just guess work to try to determine why their SWRs are so low.
Yes that's correct and he said as much in the RR interview.
My fear is that, even if it's not war, some other kind of "unknown-unknown" could cause stocks to fail.
However I guess you could say the same about TIPS or anything really. At that point you're just hand waving and not actually doing "science".
So this all leaves me feeling, maybe TIPS aren't really a safe-haven, but more of a temporary diversification/hedge in case stocks do poorly during a specific period. Beyond that, we can't expect anything more from them than we can expect from stocks. There's no way to hedge against a complete unknown.